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TORT LAW-New Mexico Adopts Proportional Indemnity
and Clouds the Distinction Between Contract and Tort:
Amrep Southwest, Inc. v. Shollenbarger Wood Treating,
Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Amrep Southwest, Inc. v. Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc.,' the
New Mexico Supreme Court extended proportional indemnity principles
to actions in contract. 2 A defendant liable in contract now has a right
to comparative contribution similar to a defendant jointly and severally
liable in tort.3 Prior to Amrep, a defendant liable under a breach of
contract theory generally had no right of contribution from negligent
parties who proximately caused the breach.4 The Amrep court also retained
the principle of active/passive indemnity 'for a defendant sued in tort.'
This Note presents the contextual background of the indemnity doctrine
and the underlying principles compelling other jurisdictions to adopt
systems of proportional indemnity; it then analyses the Amrep court's
reasoning and the implications of its decision.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Amrep Southwest, Inc. (Amrep) contracted with Baldridge Lumber
Company (Baldridge) for Baldridge to supply treated wood for use in
homes Amrep was building. 6 Baldridge then contracted with Shollenbarger
Wood Treating, Inc. (Shollenbarger) to provide Baldridge with treated
wood which would in turn be sold to Amrep.7 Amrep never contracted
directly with Shollenbarger in this matter.' During construction, Amrep
learned that the treated wood was unfit for its intended use.9 Amrep
requested that Baldridge investigate the allegations. 0 Baldridge subsequently informed Amrep that the wood was fit for its intended purpose."1
The Amrep plaintiffs as well as other homeowners claimed that the
wood was unfit for its intended purpose.' 2 The New Mexico Attorney

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

119 N.M. 542, 893 P.2d 438 (1995).
Id. at 552-54, 893 P.2d at 448-50.
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
Amrep, 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
Id. at 544, 893 P.2d at 440.
Id.
Id.

9. Id
10. Id. at 544-45, 893 P.2d at 440-41.
11. Id. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441. A factual issue existed as to whether Baldridge received
reassurances from Shollenbarger as to the fitness of the wood it was supplying, and consequently
whether Amrep disclaimed any warranties. Appellee's Answer Brief at 7-8, Amrep (No. 21,889).
12. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441.
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General took action on the homeowners' behalf, suing Amrep under the
Unfair Practices Act. l" The suit claimed that Amrep "made misleading
14
statements regarding the quality of wood used in its homebuilding.'
Amrep settled with the Attorney General and, as a condition of the
settlement, offered to perform necessary repairs. 5 Individual homeowners
had the option to accept the repairs and relinquish any future claims
arising from the wood or to pursue their own legal remedies. 6 A majority"
of homeowners opted for Amrep's offer; the remaining homeowners sued
Amrep s alleging breach of warranty, negligence, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability in tort, violation of the Unfair Practices
20 Neither Baldridge nor Shollenbarger was
Act 19 and breach of contract.
2
named in those actions. '

In response to the non-settling parties' claims, Amrep filed a thirdparty complaint against, Baldridge and Shollenbarger. 22 The claim sought
either traditional 23 or proportional indemnification for any liability it may
have had from the nonsettling parties' claims and for its costs in fulfilling
the Unfair Practices Act settlement agreement. 24 The indemnity claims
were based on theories of negligence and strict liability in tort. 25 Upon
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Shollenbarger
from the suit on the following grounds: New Mexico did not recognize
proportional indemnification; 26 the economic-loss rule 27 barred Amrep's
indemnity claims; 28 and traditional indemnification was unavailable because Amrep "was partially at fault for any damages awarded against
it in favor of the homeowners.' '29 Amrep appealed30 to the New Mexico
Supreme Court. 3'

13. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 to -22 (Repl. Pamp. 1995).
14. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441.
i5. Id.
.16. Id.
17. Of the 180 homes affected, "[a]ll but nineteen homeowners accepted the offer." Id.
18. These remaining cases were consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the present case. Appellee's
Answer Brief at 1, Amrep (No. 21,889).
19. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441.
20. Id. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441.
23. See infra notes 38 to 58 and accompanying text.
24. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441.
25. Id.
26. Appellant's Brief-In-Chief at 7, Amrep (No. 21,889).
27. In brief, the economic-loss rule provides that economic damages cannot be recovered under
a tort theory unless the plaintiff's person or property is physically impacted. See infra note 104
and accompanying text for discussion of the rule.
28. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441.
29. Id. at 544, 893 P.2d at 440.
30. Amrep's appeal was "pursuant to [N.M. R. Crw. P.] 1-054(C)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1992) (stating
that judgment dismissing all claims against one party in multiple-party litigation is a final judgment)."
Id. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441.
31. At the time of this appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court had primary appellate jurisdiction
in actions involving a claim in contract. N.M. R. App. P. 12-102(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1992). This
rule has since been modified and the Court of Appeals now has primary appellate jurisdiction for
contractual claims. N.M. R. App. P. 12-102 (1996 Supp.).
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The supreme court reversed the trial court, holding that (1) New Mexico
recognizes proportional indemnity,3' (2) a genuine issue of material fact
3 and (3) the
existed as to Amrep's claim for traditional indemnity,
34
indemnity.
for
claim
a
bar
not
does
rule
economic-loss
III.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

The doctrine of indemnity is muddled as a result of its often misunderstood relationship to contribution. In addition, the widespread shift
by states from tort systems based on contributory negligence and joint
and several liability to systems of comparative negligence and several
liability has further confused the doctrine. 5 Insight into the current status
of indemnity requires an understanding of the doctrine's roots, as well
as the effects of comparative negligence.
A.

Traditional Indemnity and Contribution Prior to Comparative
Fault
Indemnity and contribution are legal doctrines through which a party
who pays a claim or judgment to an injured party may recover some
portion of the amount-paid from a culpable third party. 6 Common-law
indemnity requires an active wrongdoer to reimburse any damages paid
by a passive party.3 7 The statutory right of contribution imposes an
obligation upon jointly and severally liable tortfeasor B to reimburse
jointly and severally liable tortfeasor A for A's payment of B's liability. 8
The right of indemnity is rooted in "equitable principles of restitution
and unjust enrichment." 3 9 Traditional indemnification is essentially "a
judicially created common-law right that grants to one who is held liable
an all-or-nothing right of recovery from a third-party." 4 0 In general, a

32. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
33. Id. at 549, 893 P.2d at 445.
34. Id. at 551, 893 P.2d at 447.
35. The doctrine of indemnity has been described as shrouded in a dense "legal vapor" as a
result of this shift. Schneider National, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 571 (Wyo. 1992).
ed.

36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 341 (5th
1984).

37. Id.
38. See Dessauer v. Memorial Gen. Hosp., 96 N.M. 92, 628 P.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1981).
39. Schneider National, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 571 (Wyo. 1992) (citing 2
GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION

§ 10.6(c) (1978)). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 886B (1979) states:
If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one of
them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to indemnity from the other if
the other would be unjustly enriched at his expense by the discharge of the liability.
40. Amreh, 119 N.M. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441. The RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937)
states:
[a]s a general rule ...
"[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a
duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have
been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the
payor is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct."
Schneider, 843 P.2d at 572. See also Wn1LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 191 (1987) (justifying all-or-nothing loss allocation in situations where

economic efficiency requires that only one party need take precautions).
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court will not create a right of indemnification unless the party seeking
indemnification stands in a prior legal relationship to the party from
whom indemnification is sought. 4' Courts recognize legal relationships
tort 42 "apart
founded on obligations lying in contract, quasi-contract'4 and
3
party.
injured
the
to
from the joint duty ... owe[d]
The type of indemnification under which the indemnitee will recover
is determined by the type of legal relationship upon which the indemnitee
claim is founded." Thus, where a right to indemnity is expressly provided
for in a contract, the indemnitee will have a right to "express indemnity"
under a contract theory.4 1 Where a contractual relationship for indemnity
is implied in fact between two parties, such as in a warranty claim, the
indemnitee will have a right of implied contractual indemnity and will
sue for breach of warranty.46 Where a relationship is implied in law
between two parties, the indemnitee will have a right of "equitable implied
47
indemnity" and will sue under a theory of negligence or strict liability.
Recovery under a right of express indemnity differs from recovery
under implied contractual indemnity and equitable implied indemnity.
Recovery under express indemnity is controlled by the contract, and the
parties may choose to allocate the percentage of indemnification between
themselves as they see fit." Because implied contractual indemnity and
equitable implied indemnity are based on legally determined obligations,
the law provides for a fixed scheme of apportionment consisting of 100%7o

recovery .49
The law giving rise to indemnity based on express or implied contract
50
is relatively straightforward and is not further addressed in this note;
1988). But some jurisdictions have done
41. Frazer v. Munsterman, 527 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (I11.
away with the pre-existing legal relationship requirement altogether. See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries,
App. Ct. 1967).
Inc., 229 N.E.2d 769, 776 (I11.
42. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76 cmt. b (1937).
43. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 545-46, 893 P.2d at 441-42 (quoting Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368, 370 (10th Cir. 1954)).
44. Schneider, 843 P.2d at 573, (citing Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d
790 (Wyo. 1991)).
45. Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, Inc., 662 P.2d 96, 99 (Wyo. 1983); Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1358 (Wyo. 1978).
46. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Services, 586 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Wyo. 1978).
47. Other terms for this type of indemnity include "implied in law indemnity" and "common
law indemnity." Schneider, 843 P.2d at 573. Implied in law indemnity is founded on a legally fixed
obligation, i.e. an obligation lying in tort. Thus, a right to indemnification may arise outside an
express or implied contractual setting "by operation of law to prevent a result which is regarded
as unjust or unsatisfactory." KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, § 51, at 341.
48. Valloric v. Dravo Corp., 357 S.E.2d 207, 208 (W. Va. 1987).
49. Schneider, 843 P.2d at 587.
50. Express indemnity is bargained for. Frank v. Storer, 517 A.2d 1098, 1103 (Md. Ct. App.
1986). Implied contractual indemnity is based on the law of warranty:
The rationale [is] that a contract under which the indemnitor undertook to do work
or perform services necessarily implied an obligation to do the work involved in
a proper manner and to discharge foreseeable damages resulting from improper
performance absent any participation by the indemnitee in the wrongful act precluding
recovery.
Bear Creek Planning Committee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 211 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Great Western Furniture Co., Inc. v. Porter Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr.
76, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)).
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the law giving rise to equitable implied indemnity is more intricate. Once
a pre-existing legal relationship is established, a party seeking traditional
equitable implied indemnity must establish that he acted passively in
comparison to the indemnitor's active negligence." With these elements
met, an indemnitee may shift 100% of its liabilities to its indemnitor.12
The test for determining whether a tortious act is "active" or "passive"
within the scope of traditional indemnity is somewhat vague. 3 A party
is considered actively negligent for indemnity purposes if he "personally
participated in an affirmative act of negligence, was connected with
negligent acts or omissions by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed
54
to perform a precise duty which the indemnitee had agreed to perform."
A party is considered passively negligent for indemnity purposes if he
"has been held liable in tort for his own negligence in failing to discover
and remedy a dangerous condition created by the negligence or wrongdoing
of another." 5 5 A party is also considered passively negligent if he is
merely the retailer in a product's chain of distribution.16 These criteria
are broad and subject to manipulation, inconsistent application, and,
consequently, criticism. 7 These characteristics often lead to inequitable
resolutions, as equitable implied indemnification allocates liability in an
"all-or-nothing" manner. 8
B. Effect of Comparative Negligence and Several Liability On
Traditional Indemnity
Motivated by inadequate contribution statutes and the adoption of
comparative negligence, some jurisdictions have done away with "all or
nothing" indemnification. 9 These jurisdictions have instead based indemnification on degree of fault when a party seeking indemnity asserts
a right to equitable implied indemnity based on a theory of negligence.6
1. Comparative Negligence and Several Liability Generally
Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence, a plaintiff who was
partially at fault for his harm was said to be "contributorily negligent,"

51. Schneider, 843 P.2d at 574. Passive negligence has also been termed "constructive negligence,"
id., or "secondary negligence." Allison v. Shell Oil, 495 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Il1. 1986).
52. Allison, 495 N.E.2d at 501.
53. Schneider, 843 P.2d at 574.
54. Schneider, 843 P.2d at 574 (citing Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97,
101 (Cal. 1975)).
55. Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahman Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 436, 457 P.2d 364, 368 (citing
Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130).
56. Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 89, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ct. App. 1987).
57. In showing its disfavor of the active/passive rule, the Schneider court stated: "[w]ith a little
ingenuity in phrasing, negligence can be made to be either 'active' or 'passive' as suits the writer."
843 P.2d at 574 (citing Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 471
(Mo. 1978)). See also Nicholas J. Bua, Third Party Practice in Illinois: Express and Implied Indemnity,
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 287, 314 (1976) ("[alll attempted definitions of active-passive indemnity break
down in application").
58. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 910 (Cal. 1978).
59. See, e.g., Allison, 495 N.E.2d 496; Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1980).
60. See, e.g., American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d 899; Allison, 495 N.E.2d 496; Kennedy, 618 P.2d
788; Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972); Schneider, 843 P.2d 561.
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and consequently could not recover any damages in tort from another
culpable party. 6' The contributory negligence doctrine is now widely
criticized as inequitable because -"[i]t places on one party the entire burden
of a loss for which two [parties] are ... responsible. ' 62 To ease the
hardship brought on plaintiffs by the contributory :negligence doctrine,
most jurisdictions have done away with contributory negligence in favor
of systems based on comparative negligence. 6 3 Comparative negligence
awards damages in proportion to fault." Comparative
negligence exists
65
in three forms: pure, modified, and slight/gross.
New Mexico adopted a system of pure comparative negligence for tort
liability in Scott v. Rizzo in 1981." In that case, the defendants raised
the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs as an affirmative defense.
The supreme court rejected this defense and adopted comparative negligence on the grounds that "the doctrine of comparative negligence more
equitably apportions damages
.
[than] the 'all-or-nothing' rule of

contributory negligence.'

'67

Comparative negligence remedied the inequity between a plaintiff and
a defendant. Furthermore, the principles underlying its adoption forced
courts to reexamine inequities between co-tortfeasors arising under the
doctrine of joint and several liability. 68 Under joint and several liability,
one of multiple tortfeasors may be "liable for the entire amount of the
damage caused by [the group]." 69 Joint and several liability appears
inequitable in that a party may be liable for more than its percentage
of fault. 70 To ameliorate this problem, legislatures 7I established statutory
rights to contribution among joint-tortfeasors. 72 Under a right of contribution, a tortfeator who discharges a co-tortfeasor's liability may get
a judgment against the co-tortfeasor for the amount of the co-tortfeasor's
liability that it discharges.
61. KEETON ET AL. supra note 36, § 67, at 469. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467.
62. Id.; see also Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975) (concluding
that "the doctrine is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in
proportion to fault").
63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36,

§ 67,

at 471.

64. See id. at 472.
65. Id.
66. 96 N.M. 682, 684, 634 P.2d 1234, 1236.
67. Id.
68. See Weeks v. Feltner, 297 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that adoption of
comparative negligence did not require the abrogation of joint and several liability); American
Motorcycle, 578 P.2d 899.
69. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 154, 646 P.2d 579, 581 (Ct.
App. 1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d.794 (1982) (citing Salazar v. Murphy, 66 N.M.
25, 340 P.2d 1075 (1959)).
70. American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 911.
71. Under classical common law, courts did not recognize a right to contribution because the
equitable principles in support of such a doctrine did not outweigh the maxim that "the law will
not aid a wrongdoer"; consequently, contribution had to be established legislatively. American
Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 907. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, cmt. a, for historical
roots of common-law rule against contribution.
72. In New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -8 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 and Cum. Supp.
1995) (Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act) (creating right to contribution based on
principles of comparative fault).
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Nevertheless, contribution has not completely remedied the inequities
of joint and several liability. The risk that a concurrent tortfeasor may
be insolvent or unavailable is still placed on the defendant regardless of
the concurrent tortfeasor's degree of fault.73 In light of this inequity,
New Mexico has concluded that under a system of comparative negligence,
the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, should bear the risk that another
defendant is insolvent. 7 4 Relying on these equitable considerations, New
Mexico has substituted a system of apportioning damages amongst defendants based on principles of comparative fault or several liability in
place of joint and several liability in most circumstances.', Where joint
and several liability has been preserved, either the legislature or the
judiciary has made a policy decision that the party found liable in tort,
rather than the party suffering the loss, should bear the risk of an
76
insolvent defendant.

2. The Shortfalls of Contribution: Proportional Indemnity to the
Rescue
The widespread adoption of comparative negligence has changed the
doctrine of indemnity. Courts now apply the doctrine of indemnity to
apportion damages according to fault where contribution statutes do not
otherwise allow for such apportionment. 7 The doctrine of indemnity is
effectively becoming the common-law shadow of contribution. As a result,
apportionment of liability in an all-or-nothing manner is being abandoned .78
California was one of the first jurisdictions to adopt a system of
proportional indemnity, and American Motorcycle 9 is typical of many
courts' reasonings. In that case a defendant co-sponsored a motorcycle
race in which a minor was injured. 0 The defendant was potentially subject
to joint and several liability in an action brought by the parents. 8' The
defendant sought declaratory judgment as to the comparative negligence
of the minor's parents for negligently granting permission for the child
to enter the race. 82 The defendant also sought indemnity from the parents,
alleging that the parents were actively negligent for granting the minor
permission to participate in the race, while the defendant was merely
83
passively negligent in sponsoring the race.

73. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
74. Id.
75. This substitution was accomplished in Bartlett and later codified by the New Mexico legislature
in N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3A-1 to -2 (Supp. 1995). See also Andrew G. Schultz & M.E. Occhialino,
Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A Commentary and Quasi-legislative History,
18 N.M. L. REV. 483 (1988).
76. Schultz & Occhialino, 18 N.M. L. REV. 487- 94.
77. See supra note 60.
78. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
79. American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d. 899.

80. Id. at 902.
81. Id.

82. Id. at 903.
83. Id.
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The court would not assess the parents' fault under principles of several
liability. 84 Furthermore, the defendant lacked a right to contribution from
the parents because the contribution statute required a joint judgment
as a prerequisite. 5 The court, constrained by legislative enactment from
modifying the contribution statute,8 6 nonetheless felt compelled to fashion
a just remedy using the doctrine of indemnity.87 Upon examining the allor-nothing rule of indemnity in light of Yellow Cab, the court stated:
[tihe all-or-nothing aspect of the doctrine has precluded courts from
reaching a just solution in the great majority of cases in which equity
and fairness call for an apportionment of loss between the wrongdoers
in proportion to their relative culpability .... 88
The court ruled that principles of comparative fault require apportionment
of- tort liability among defendants in a comparative manner. Otherwise,
the offsetting of tort liability in an all-or-nothing manner is inconsistent
with principles of comparative fault.8 9
9°
Like the California statute, New Mexico's Contribution Act excludes
some classes of defendants. The Act does not provide for apportionment
of fault for a defendant liable in contract; "[c]ontribution is available
under the Act only for tort liability." 91 With no rights under the Contribution Act, a defendant liable in contract prior to Amrep was subject
to all-or-nothing liability. 92
IV.

RATIONALE

The Amrep court made two key rulings: (1) it affirmed the validity
of shifting 100% of liability from one person to another pursuant to
the prior law of active/passive negligence in limited situations, and (2)
it created a right to proportional indemnity when proration according to
fault is otherwise unavailable.

84. The court was not persuaded that its decision in Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975),
implicitly replaced joint and several liability with several liability. American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d
at 905.
85. American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 910.
86. Id. At that time, a joint judgment had to be rendered against both defendant parties for
one party to have a right of contribution against the other, and there was no prospect of a joint
judgment in" this case. CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE. §§ 875-79.
87. American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 907.
88. Id. at 910.
89. Each jurisdiction adopting proportional indemnity vests the right with different attributes;
however, each case stands for the proposition that the equitable principles underlying the adoption
of comparative negligence mandate that indemnity allocates liability in a manner proportional to
fault in at least some situations. Cf. cases cited supra note 60.
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -8 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
91. Appellant's Brief-In-Chief at 16, Amrep (No. 21,889) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2(A)
("[tihe right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors"); Kinetics, Inc. v. El Paso Products,
Co., 99 N.M. 22, 28, 653 P.2d 522, 528 (Ct. App. 1982) ("party liable under a theory of respondeat
superior is not a joint tortfeasor and therefore cannot seek contribution under the Act")). Accord
Higgins Erectors & Haulers, Inc. v.. E.E. Austin & Son, 714 F. Supp. 756, 759 (W.D. Pa. 1989)
("party liable for breach of construction contract had no right of contribution").
92. See Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552-53, 893 P.2d 448-49.
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Amrep urged the court to "replace completely traditional indemnification with proportional indemnification. " 93 The court declined to follow
precedent from other jurisdictions which adopted comparative negligence
and which abandoned the active/passive rule.94 In so doing, the court
stated that "[tiraditional indemnification addresses other considerations
of contractual right or of restitution to which a passive wrongdoer is
entitled." 95 Consistent with this statement, the court permitted Amrep's
claim for traditional indemnity based on active/passive negligence.9 As
a result, the court ruled that Amrep would have to prove it was merely
passively negligent to have
full recovery on its traditional indemnity claim
97
against Shollenbarger .
Following other jurisdictions," the Amrep court also created a right
to proportional indemnity.9 The court reasoned that the equitable principles underlying its adoption of comparative negligence in Scott mandated
that it create a right of proportional indemnity.' °° The right extends to
a "defendant who cannot raise the fault of a concurrent tortfeasor as
a defense because of the plaintiff's choice of remedy"'10 or to a defendant
who cannot claim a right to "contribution or some other form of proration
of fault [from other] tortfeasors." 10

2

The court departed from other

jurisdictions which adopted proportional indemnity 0 3 by extending the
right to actions where a defendant is liable to an injured party outside
of tort, such as contract and unfair trade practices. 1°4

93. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
94. Amrep presented in its brief-in-chief precedent from jurisdictions that abandoned active/
passive indemnity because of the doctrine's incompatibility with comparative fault: Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc. 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Allison, 495
N.E.2d 496, 501; Kennedy, 618 P.2d 788, 798-803; Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d
362, 366-68 (Minn. 1977) (en banc); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d
466, 469-73 (Mo. 1970); Dole, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-92; B&B Auto Supply, Sand Pit & Trucking
Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Tex. 1980); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transp. Corp., 202 N.W.2d 268, 270-72 (Wis. 1972); Schneider, 843 P.2d 561.
95. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449. For a discussion of equitable justifications for
active/passive rule upon which the court may have relied, compare cases cited supra notes 39 &
40 and accompanying text.
96. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 549, 893 P.2d at 445.
97. Id. at 549-50, 893 P.2d at 445-46.
98. Id. at 551, 893 P.2d at 447 (citing American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d 899; Allison, 495 N.E.2d
496; Schneider, 843 P.2d 561).
99. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552-54, 893 P.2d at 448-50.
100. Id. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
103. Id. at 551, 893 P.2d at 447 (citing American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d 899; Allison, 495 N.E.2d
496; Schneider, 843 P.2d 561).
104. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
The court also clarified the relationship between the economic-loss rule and a claim for proportional
indemnification. Id. at 549-51, 893 P.2d 445-47. Economic-losses are losses where the plaintiff has
suffered "no physical impact to his person or property." DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES 116 (2d ed. 1994). See also Utah International, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M.
539, 541 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 354, 772 P.2d 884 (1989). Shollenbarger argued
that Amrep's potential contract liability would constitute an economic-loss. Appellee's Answer Brief
at 32-34, Amrep v. Shollenbarger, 119 N.M. 542, 893 P.2d 438 (1995) (No. 21,889). Because the
economic-loss rule bars the recovery of economic-loss damages in a tort action, Amrep, 119 N.M.
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ANALYSIS

Proportional indemnity as established in Amrep is a substantial new
right raising issues for later resolution. The court is logically inconsistent
in ruling that principles of fairness mandate proportional indemnity while
also preserving all-or-nothing active/passive indemnity. Furthermore, the
court does not explain clearly how liability based on a no-fault theory
should be apportioned according to fault in a proportional indemnification
action. Finally, by allowing tort damage principles to offset contractual
liability, the court is limiting the traditional scope of contract.
First, the Amrep court views its adoption of proportional indemnity
05
as substantially completing the task it began in Scott v. Rizzo' of
° But the court did not explain why
allocating liability based on fault.10
the adoption of comparative negligence in Scott does not eliminate active/
passive indemnity. These actions are logically inconsistent. If the passive
wrongdoer is a tortfeasor, there is no reason to allow the wrongdoer to
recover 100% from another tortfeasor. Instead, logically, comparative
fault principles should come into play and passive negligence should entail
at least a small portion of fault.
Other jurisdictions have recognized this inconsistency. In Allison v.
Shell Oil Co., I°7 the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that pure comparative negligence was inconsistent with the theory of all-or-nothing
active/passive indemnity. 0 8 Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court modified
active/passive indemnity as follows:109
in-actions where comparative negligence is in issue the court deals in
percentages of causal responsibility, and distinctions between primary,
secondary, active and passive negligence lose their previous identities.
The nature of misconduct in such cases is to be expressed on the
basis of degrees of comparative fault or causation, and the all or
nothing concepts are swept aside.Y0
In the interest of jurisprudential consistency, New Mexico should follow
Illinois and Kansas and abandon the active/passive rule. As a result of
New Mexico's current inconsistency, a party found liable in tort may
now have a right to proportional recovery under the Contribution Act"'
or a right to all-or-nothing recovery under the principles of active/passive

at 551, 893 P.2d at 447, and Amrep's claim for equitable implied indemnity was based in tort, id.
at 547, 893 P.2d at 443, Shollenbarger asserted that the claim must be barred by the economicloss rule. Id. While the court gave weight to this argument, it decided that it would be "unjust"
to bar Amrep's claim on the basis of the economic-loss rule. Id. at 551, 893 P.2d at 447. The
court did not otherwise limit the economic-loss rule. Id.
105. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
106. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
107. 495 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 1986).
108. Allison, 495 N.E.2d at 501. This note does not address the logic behind the Amrep court's
affirmation of active/passive indemnity in strict products liability actions.
109. Id.
110. Kennedy, 618 P.2d at 798.
Ill. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -8 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 and Cum. Supp. 1995) (Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).
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indemnity. 112 A party found liable in contract, however, now has a right
of proportional recovery under proportional indemnity, but does not have
a right to all-or-nothing recovery under active/passive indemnity.
Second, the court determined that New Mexico courts should apportion
damages between the indemnitor and the indemnitee based on principles
of comparative fault." 3 This poses a jurisprudential problem with practical
implications. Fault is not an element of contractual liability," 4 yet a party
seeking proportional indemnity for contractual liability will use principles
of comparative fault to apportion the no-fault6 liability."' The court does
not indicate how to reconcile this problem."
Third, the Amrep court's opinion on the overlap between contract and
tort is evident by the introduction of tort-based damage setoffs into the
field of contractual remedies. ' 7 Amrep can be viewed as both an incursion
on the field of contract as well as an affirmation-by-omission of the
core of its classical assumption: the freedom of the individual to contract. I18
Under Amrep, a defendant found jointly and severally liable in contract
with a right of proportional indemnity is similarly situated to a defendant
jointly and severally liable in tort with a right of comparative contribution.
Like a defendant jointly and severally liable in tort, a defendant liable
on a contract theory continues to be responsible for 10007o of the plaintiff's
awarded damages. ' 9 After Amrep, however, a defendant liable in contract
may seek proportional indemnity based on principles of comparative fault
in the same way a defendant jointly and severally liable in tort can seek
comparative contribution. 20 In effect, a party in Amrep's position may
now seek economic damages from a third party in a tort action even
2
though he has suffered no physical .impact to his person or property.' '
This introduction of tort principles into the realm of contract buttresses
Gilmore's notion of "contort," the reabsorption of contract principles

112. See Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552-54, 893 P.2d at 448-50.
113. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
114. Paiz v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 118 N.M. 203, 212, 880 P.2d 300, 309 (1994).
115. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552-53, 893 P.2d at 448-49.
116. The problems could be solved by treating the action for proportional indemnity like a
negligence action between the indemnitee and the indemnitor. The court would assume for purposes
of the proportional indemnity action only that the indemnitee was negligent to some degree and
the negligence was a proximate cause of the breach. The court should then determine whether the
indemnitor was negligent and whether and to what degree the negligence was a proximate cause of
the underlying breach. Cf. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449 (stating that Amrep should
seek recovery for "percentage of fault attributable to Shollenbarger"). The indemnitor would be
liable to the indemnitee for its portion of the fault. While this plan would solve the practical
problem, it would be founded on a fiction and the jury instructions would be exceedingly complicated
and contrived.
117. Id.
118. FRIEDRICH KESSLER, Introduction: Contract As a Principle of Order, in FRIEDRICH KESSLER

ET AL., CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1986) (stating classical model of contract theory), excerpted in PETER
LINZER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 33 (Anderson Publishing) (2d ed. 1995).
119. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).

120. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552-54, 893 P.2d at 448-50.
121. Id. at 549-54, 893 P.2d at 445-50. See supra note 104 on economic-loss rule.
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into tort' 22-the "residual category of civil liability."' 23 In this way Amrep
allows tort to encroach upon the scope of contract's domain.
However, Amrep should not be read as an indication of the court's
willingness to further encroach on the scope of contract. Amrep creates
rights for a liable defendant against persons who have no contract with
the defendant; it does not affect fundamental remedial rights between
Amrep and the homeowners. These remedial rights continue to be controlled by the express terms of the contract. 24 In other words, if found
liable under a contract theory, a breaching party must still compensate
100% of the non-breaching party's awarded damages even though the
breaching party may not in fact be 100% responsible for the breach.,25
Although the Amrep court indicates a strong preference for the extension
of comparative fault principles, 26 it stops short of substituting principles
of comparative fault for the parties' bargained-for remedies. 27 In this
12
sense then, the court has preserved the parties' freedom to contract. 1
VI.

IMPLICATIONS

Amrep has four main implications. First, a party which discharges a
judgment based on contractual liability may now pursue a claim against
a wrongful third party for a portion of the liability. 29 Second, courts
may be more likely to enforce non-traditional loss setoffs such as several
liability in place of joint and several liability. Although Amrep continues
to hold the breaching party 100% liable for the non-breaching party's
loss, the court indicates a desire to aid breaching parties. 30 In light of
this policy decision, it is a small step for courts to recognize and enforce
parties' rights to freely allocate the risk of a judgment-proof third-party
amongst themselves' as they see fit. Consequently, Amrep could bargain
for several liability with other homeowners in the future.
Third, it will now be marginally easier for third-party plaintiffs to
implead third-party defendants. 3' To bring in a third-party defendant,
the third-party plaintiff must prove that the third-party defendant is or
32
may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for its liability to the plaintiff. 1

122. GRANT Gu.MoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974). Laycock notes that the economic-loss
rule "polic[es] the boundary between tort and contract." Supra note 104, at 117. By removing this
"boundary" for third-party plaintiffs, Amrep erodes the scope of contract. Cf. Symposium: Re-

considering Grant Gilmore's "The Death of Contract" 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1995).
123. Gm.moa, supra note 122, at 87.
124. See Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
125. Id. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
126. Id.
127. Cf2Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552-54, 893 P.2d at 448-50.
128. The New Mexico Supreme Court previously stated its support of the policy of freedom to
contract: "New Mexico has a strong public policy of freedom to contract that requires enforcement

of contracts unless they clearly contravene some law or rule of public morals." United Wholesale
Liquor Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 108 N.M. 467, 471, 775 P.2d 233, 237 (1989).
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
Id.
N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-014 (Repl. Pamp. 1992); FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
Id.
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Prior to Amrep, a plaintiff could do this by establishing that it may
have a right of contribution, contractual indemnity, active/passive indemnity, or several liability.' Because Amrep creates a broadly applicable
right to indemnity, the defendant can bring in virtually any other party
which, within the bounds of good faith," 4 may be potentially responsible
for the third-party plaintiff's potential liability.'35 Amrep gives defendants
a widespread substantive right against third parties; consequently, defense
attorneys will have an easier time impleading other parties.
Fourth, while proportional indemnity seems appealing in its extension
of fundamental values of fairness, it has systemic drawbacks. Litigation
will increase due to defendants' increased ease in joining third-party
defendants in contract-based suits.' 316 Additionally, litigation will become
more complex. 3 7 Procedural jockeying and the attendant costs and uncertainties which accompany complex litigation will only increase.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Amrep preserves active/passive indemnity for a defendant sued in tort
while creating a right to proportional indemnity for other defendants
whose liability may not otherwise be susceptible to proration based on
principles of comparative fault. Furthermore, Amrep manifests the New
Mexico Supreme Court's approval of the overlap between contract and
tort, and opens the door for more creative contractual remedies.
JAMES M. MOCK

133. Several liability does not fit the technical requirements of the "is or may be liable to" clause
of N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-014, but Tipton v. Texaco, 106 N.M. 689, 692, 712 P.2d 1351, 1354 (1985),

mitigates this barrier in New Mexico so that the clause bars virtually no party potentially liable in
tort.
134. See N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-011 (Supp. 1992); FED R. Civ. P. II.
135. Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552-54, 893 P.2d at 448-50.

136. In disapproving of the adoption of proportional indemnity, the dissent in Schneider, 843
P.2d at 588 stated:

This case may produce more litigation, more business for lawyers, more costs and
expenses to the legal system, and more confusion and uncertainty in the law than
anything since centuries ago when a forgotten English Lord sitting on the King's
Bench ... said "let the negligence trial begin."
137. Id.

